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DETERMINING THE EFFICIENCY OF HORIZONTAL
MERGERS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ABANDONED
COCA-COLA/DR. PEPPER AND PEPSI/7-UP MERGERS
OF 1986
Lloyd R. Cohen*
Thomas J. Alore**
INTRODUCTION
Horizontal integration or merger is the amalgamation of two or more
independent competing firms selling similar goods or services.' The moti-
vation for such mergers may be either pro-competitive, enabling the merged
firms to utilize economies of scale and scope, or anti-competitive, reducing
competition within the industry, thereby permitting firms within the industry
to reduce output and raise prices. Predicting which net effect a merger will
have, or analyzing the overall efficiency of an actual merger is, to say the
least, extremely difficult.
Since the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v.
United States,2 the courts and federal agencies have focused primarily on
the market shares held by the merging firms to predict whether a merger
will have an anti-competitive effect and thus violate antitrust law.3 If the
merged firms result in an entity controlling an "undue percentage share" of
the relevant market, and there is a significant increase in the concentration
of firms in that market, it is presumed that such a merger is anti-competitive. 4
The problems with this approach are twofold. First, it is a very imperfect
measure of the possible anti-competitive effects brought on by increased
concentration. Second, the only method of refuting the inferences of probable
anti-competitive effect of mergers in a concentrated industry is by showing
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law (on leave); John M.
Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School.
** J.D., California Western School of Law; Member of California Bar.
1. K. CLA.RnsoN & R. MILLER, INVusTw& ORoAzA.ioN: THEORY, EVDENCE AD PUBLIC
PoLicY 339 (1982).
2. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3. Id. at 344-45. The Court stated that "expansion through merger is more likely to
reduce available consumer choice while providing no increase in industry capacity, jobs or
output." Id. at 345 n.72.
4. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (holding that
congressional concern with increasing concentration warranted the presumption of anti-com-
petitive effect).
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countervailing pro-competitive efficiency enhancing effects., Yet, even
professionals in the field of industrial organization generally cannot marshal
persuasive evidence of pro-competitive economics of scale and scope that
will lower costs.
Recent attempts by the Coca-Cola Company ("Coca-Cola") to merge with
the Dr. Pepper Company ("Dr. Pepper") and PepsiCo Incorporated ("Pepsi")
to merge with the Seven-Up Company ("7-Up") have been abandoned
because of Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") opposition and the obvious
risk, cost, and delay that a court fight would entail. Was this a good result?
Antitrust economics is ambiguous in its policy prescription in such cases.
On the one hand there is the anti-competitive effect of greater concentration,
at least arguably significant where the particular companies' market shares
are approximately Coca-Cola 37.4 percent, Pepsi 28.9 percent, Dr. Pepper
4.6 percent, and 7-Up 5.7 percent. 6 If there are industries where mergers are
to be feared because of market concentration, then the soft drink industry
is certainly a strong candidate. On the other side of the ledger are the
possible productive efficiency gains that might result from any new combi-
nation of resources, whether in manufacturing, advertising, distribution or
elsewhere. The analysis is fine as far as it goes. Yet, a court, enforcement
agency, or policy maker must not only be aware of the possible pro- and
anti-competitive effects, it must also be able to weigh those effects and make
a judgment about the overall virtue of the merger. Unfortunately, a com-
parison of the weight of these two countervailing effects is probably impos-
sible. Whatever limited success there may be in measuring the social welfare
loss from possible restrictions on output, the likelihood of getting acceptably
accurate measures of the pro-competitive increases in productivity are minute.
Nonetheless, there appears to be a revealing bit of collateral evidence that
has surfaced in the soft drink cases. It is well recognized by economists that,
if these mergers are anti-competitive, in addition to any gain that will accrue
to the participants, relatively larger gains will accrue to other firms in the
industry. Similarly, the greatest loss that will result if the mergers are pro-
competitive will be to other firms in the industry who will have to decrease
prices and improve quality. Therefore, the attitudes held by those firms who
have the most to gain and lose by the mergers can be very revealing. Royal
Crown Cola Co. ("RC"), a competitor of the merging firms, petitioned the
FTC to stop both mergers. 7 Thus, it is likely that the mergers would have
5. United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). The Court announced
that it would give great importance to practical realities in determining whether the inference
of probable anti-competitive effect from the government's prima facie case under § 7 of the
Clayton Act was rebutted. Id. at 631.
6. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1986).
Together, these four companies controlled 76.6% of the soft drink market in 1986. Id.
7. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982), the FTC is empowered to bring a proceeding against
any person, partnership or corporation that uses unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce. RC was able to intervene under the same section which goes on to state "'[any
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been significantly pro-competitive. This Article examines the abandoned
carbonated soft drink mergers of 1986 to illustrate and explore how the
reactions of competing firms to mergers within their industry is indicative
of either the pro-competitive or anti-competitive nature of these mergers.
I. TiH CARBONATED SoFr DRINK INDUSTRY
On January 24, 1986, Pepsi announced that it would purchase, for $380
million, the soft drink operations of 7-Up from Philip Morris Incorporated.
Four weeks later, on February 20, 1986, Coca-Cola announced that it would
acquire Dr. Pepper for $470 million.8
In early February, the FTC contacted Coca-Cola and advised it that it
was conducting a non-public investigation of Pepsi's proposed acquisition
of 7-Up. Coca-Cola expected that the scope of the investigation would be
broadened to include its proposed acquisition of Dr. Pepper as soon as the
FTC learned of it. Coca-Cola was hopeful that it would be able to persuade
the FTC not to challenge the transaction or, in the event the FTC did
challenge the acquisition, to defeat any injunction.9
On June 19, 1986, RC filed an antitrust suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia, seeking to both preliminarily and
permanently stop Coca-Cola from completing its proposed merger with Dr.
Pepper, and Pepsi from going ahead with its plans to acquire 7-Up. 0 RC
asserted that each of these acquisitions, if consummated, would substantially
lessen competition in the soft drink industry in violation of the Clayton
Act," as well as constitute a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
person, partnership, or corporation may make application, and upop good cause shown may
be allowed by the Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in
person." Id.
8. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for A Temporary Restraining
Order at 4, Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ. 86-107-col (M. Dist. Ga. 1986)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Memo of Law].
9. Affidavit of Chester J. Evans at 3, Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ.
86.107-col (M. Dist. Ga. 1986). Chester J. Evans is the senior vice-president and chief financial
officer of the Coca-Cola USA Division of the Coca-Cola Company.
10. Private actions for antitrust violations are brought under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), which
states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). The Clayton Act states in pertinent part that:
[nio corporation ... shall acquire ... the whole or any part of the stock . . .of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.
Id.
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Act" by unreasonably restraining competition and monopolizing or attempt-
ing to monopolize certain segments of that industry." Coca-Cola defended
its planned acquisition as pro-competitive while Pepsi challenged the RC
action as meritless.14
A hearing on the application for a temporary restraining order was held
on June 20, 1986. The court issued a temporary restraining order to maintain
the status quo pending a hearing, set for June 30, to determine whether an
injunction should issue. That same day, June 20, the four members of the
FTC voted unanimously to challenge both Pepsi's and Coca-Cola's acqui-
sitions.5
The FTC based its objections to both of these mergers on the grounds
that, if they were completed, the carbonated soft drink industry would
become excessively concentrated and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI"), a measure of market concentration, would rise above approved
limits. 6 There are 11 concentrate firms with at least a 1 percent market
share who compete in the United States carbonated soft drink industry. 7
The HIHI for the soft drink industry was 2,373 in 1986, and the four largest
firms in the market had a combined market share in excess of 79 percent.'
Under the merger guidelines employed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"),
any merger or acquisition that results in an I-LHI over 1,800 and that raises
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
Id. at § 1.
Section 2 allows for similar punishment of any person who monopolizes or attempts to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the States or with foreign nations. Id.
at § 2.
13. RC argued that if the transactions were not enjoined, Pepsi and Coca-Cola would
jointly control approximately 80% of the domestic market for carbonated soft drinks. As a
result, smaller competitors would be driven out of business in the United States. Plaintiff's
Memo of Law, supra note 8, at 12-27.
14. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, § IV, at 4, col. 5.
15. Transcript of Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Royal Crown Cola Co.
v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ. 86-107-col (M. Dist. Ga. June 25, 1986) [hereinafter TRO Transcript].
16. See infra notes 80-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DOJ Merger
Guidelines and the use of the HHI in assessing horizontal mergers.
17. The market shares of the national concentrate manufacturers in 1985 were: Coca-Cola
38.6%, Pepsi 27.4%, Dr. Pepper 7.1%, 7-Up 6.3%, R. J. Reynolds (Canada Dry, Sunkist,
Hawaiian Punch, Cott, No-Cal) 4.6%, RC 3.5%, Shasta 1.4%, Monarch 1.4%, Proctor &
Gamble (Crush, Hires) 1.3%, Squirt 1.2%, and A&W 1.0%. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
at 9-10, Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ. 86-107-col (M. Dist. Ga. 1986).
18. Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 14, Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ.
86-107-col (M. Dist. Ga. 1986).
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the HHI by more than 100 points will be presumed likely to substantially
lessen competition except in extraordinary cases.' 9 If both the Coca-Cola
and Pepsi acquisitions were consummated, combining the four largest con-
centrate manufacturers into two, the HHI would have increased by 893
points to 3,266, 345 points for the Pepsi merger and 548 points for the
Coca-Cola merger.20
On June 23, Pepsi and 7-Up announced that they were terminating efforts
to conclude the transaction. The following day the action against them was
dismissed and the restraining order of June 20, 1986 was vacated. 2' On June
24, the FTC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, moving to preliminarily enjoin Coca-Cola from acquiring Dr.
Pepper." The FTC challenged the acquisition on two grounds. First, the
FTC found that Dr. Pepper competed directly with Coca-Cola products
(particularly Mr. Pibb, Coca-Cola's cherry flavored soda), and that such
competition would be eliminated.2? Second, and most important, the acqui-
sition would increase concentration in the carbonated soft drink market and
encourage tacit price collusion and other parallel policies of mutual advantage
between Coca-Cola and Pepsi, thus resulting in a lessening of competition.
24
Coca-Cola agreed to refrain from any efforts to close the transaction until
the court ruled on the injunction. On June 25, 1986, the Georgia District
Court converted the temporary restraining order maintaining the status quo
in RC's civil action into a preliminary injunction." On July 31, 1986, the
District Court for the District of Columbia also granted a preliminary
injunction blocking the Coca-Cola/Dr. Pepper merger. In granting the pre-
liminary injunction blocking the acquisition of Dr. Pepper by Coca-Cola,
the Federal District Court expressly rejected reliance on any economic the-
ory.26 On August 5, 1986, Coca-Cola abandoned its plans to acquire Dr.
19. United States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 3.11 (1984) [hereinafter DOJ
Merger Guidelines]. This section sets out the general standards for evaluating horizontal mergers.
Subsection (c) applied in this case because the post-merger HHI was over 1800. In this situation
the DOJ considered the industry to be highly concentrated and any additional concentration
resulting from mergers a matter of "significant competitive concern." Id.
20. Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, supra note 18, at 14.
21. Stipulation and Order at 1, Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Civ. 86-107-col
(M. Dist. Ga. Aug. 25, 1986).
22. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (D.D.C. 1986).
23. Id. at 1131.
24. Id.
25. TRO Transcript, supra note 15, at 30.
26. The court concluded that it:
should not in any event, rely on the economic testimony in reaching a conclusion
about the probable effects of the proposed acquisition given the concentrated nature
of the market just outlined. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was not designed to
support a particular economic theory; it was directed at what Congress in the
exercise of its own common sense perceived.
Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. at 1138. See also Prager, How Much Is Enough? Antitrust
Developments Affecting Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 ANTmIusT L.J. 303, 317-21 (1987)
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Pepper. Several days later, the RC civil action against Coca-Cola in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia was dismissed
and the preliminary injunction issued on June 25 was vacated.
Had these challenged mergers been the subject of a full scale trial, a
paramount issue would have been whether the possible or probable anti-
competitive effects of the merger would have been greater than countervailing
pro-competitive effects. 27 Unfortunately for Coca-Cola and Pepsi, the current
judicial process for operationally measuring the anti-competitive effects of
a proposed merger is, at best, highly imperfect. In addition, there is no way
to demonstrate analytically or measure operationally any anticipated pro-
competitive effects.Y Before attempting to determine the competitiveness of
these particular mergers, let us examine the economic theory and legal
doctrine of mergers.
II. THE EcoNoMcs oF HORIZONTAL MERGER
Antitrust laws have been employed to attack a variety of business activities
which are believed to adversely affect competition. Horizontal mergers lie
near the middle on a continuum of these activities in terms of their effect
on social wealth. They are neither definitively anti-competitive nor pro-
competitive.
Firm activities such as cartelization stand at one end of the continuum.
A cartel is formed when firms in a particular industry band together with
the express desire to limit output and increase prices and industry profits. 9
Cartelization, if successful, will necessarily lead to higher prices, and lower
output levels in the industry.30 Virtually all cartels decrease social wealth and
for that reason are considered socially undesirable. Under our laws, after
some uncertainty in the early part of the century, cartelization has been
determined to be unlawful per se.3'
(reviewing recent horizontal merger decisions, author has concluded that while some courts use
economic analysis in reviewing mergers, the "populist brand" of mergeT analysis is still alive).
27. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text (discussing the case law of antitrust as
applied to horizontal mergers); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497
(1974).
28. See Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. at 1141. The court cautioned against using any
economic theory such as wealth maximization or efficiency-through-acquisition because they
were untried.
29. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN EcoNowic PERSPEC TvE 39-40 (1976).
30. R. PosNEa & F. EAsTE BROOK, ANTTRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERALs 96 (2d ed. 1981). To maintain a successful cartel the members must agree to a set
output and a set price. Id.
31. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897) (holding
that agreements among railroads to control freight rates worked to res:rain trade, even in the
absence of proof that the purpose of the agreement was to raise rates above a "reasonable"
level). But see United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (one year later
the Court noted that certain collateral restraints of trade to otherwise valid contracts are legal
under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
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However, while cartelization has been deemed unequivocally illegal, not
all restraints on trade have been held necessarily illegal throughout the
existence of the antitrust laws. For example, in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co.," a cartel case, Judge Taft declared that all contracts
restraining competition between competitors or potential competitors were
illegal at common law, except those restraints that were reasonable in extent,
necessary to protect the parties, and merely ancillary to the main purpose
of a lawful contract."3 Such an ancillary restraint of trade would be part
and parcel of a business practice whose purpose is to take advantage of
economies of scale and scope, or diminished transaction costs. Such a practice
would result in lower costs and would, therefore, add to social wealth.
If cartels as anti-competitive activities which clearly decrease social wealth
are on one end of the continuum, on the other end of the spectrum is an
amalgam of alleged anti-competitive activities such as "tie-in" arrange-
ments, 4 "resale price maintenance" ("rpm")" and "basing point pricing,' '36
which embody the principle of ancillary restraints. Modern economic theory
reveals that these practices, in general, increase social wealth. Nonetheless,
such market activities are generally held to be illegal because it is thought
that they substantially lessen competition.
The standard argument against tie-in arrangements, rpms and basing point
pricing is that they may be used as a device for extending market power
which would ultimately lead to higher prices, less efficient operation of the
competitive mechanism and excessive use of resources. However, the view
of market activity and market power that underlies the antipathy to these
firm practices is, at best, incomplete and distorted.
32. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (defendants were manufacturers of cast iron pipe who had
created an association to territorially divide major buyers in their market).
33. Id. at 282-83. Some covenants that will generally be upheld are: (I) non-competition
clauses in the sale of a business; (2) restrictive covenants for retiring partners in a firm; and,
(3) non-competition clauses in employment contracts. Id.
34. Tie-in arrangements relate to the practice of tying the sale of one or more goods to
the sale of another product. Under such an agreement, the seller refuses to sell one product to
a customer unless the customer also agrees to buy another product from the seller. Generally,
one of the products is highly desirable, and the seller requires the buyer to purchase a less
desirable product as well. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (sales of
copyrighted films were tied to purchase of inferior films); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (sales of patented salt machines were tied to the purchase of salt).
35. Resale price maintenance refers to an agreement between the buyer and seller of goods.
The seller contractually sets the price at which his buyer can resell the product. See, e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (agreement setting
maximum resale price); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911) (agreement setting minimum resale price).
36. Basing-point pricing is a system under which sellers, in quoting a delivered price to
the buyer, compute the transportation cost from a standard point. Every seller will use the
same point of origin in calculating freight charges to be added to the base price. See, e.g.,
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (agreement among competitors
to use multiple basing-point pricing system).
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There are a number of reasons for firms to employ each of these suspect
devices. Firms may engage in tie-in arrangements because of the cost savings
that may be associated with the tie. Tie-ins may enable the seller to decrease
its advertising, sale and delivery costs. The cost reduction could result in
higher profits to the seller and/or a lower combined price to the buyer.7 In
either case it would represent an increase in social wealth. Similarly, in
certain circumstances, such as in the sale of technical goods, resale price
maintenance may be justified to prevent discount stores from being able to
get a free-ride on pre-sales service provided by specialty shops.3
Rather than being anti-competitive, basing-point pricing can only be ra-
tionally explained as a reflection of the firms' non-collusive decisions in
seeking to maximize profits.3 9 A producer that locates a plant away from
the major production site reduces the transportation necessary to reach some
buyers, but it also raises average production costs.40 The remote producer's
profit maximizing price strategy is to match the price of his more favorably
located competitors including their transportation costs. This strategy appears
bizarre at first blush because it entails charging more to these customers
who are nearer than to some of those who are further away from his plant.4'
Unlike cartels, tie-ins, resale price maintenance, and basing-point pricing,
horizontal mergers are immune to economic theory. Even after careful
analysis, their effect on social wealth remains ambiguous. This is because
economic theory reveals two very plausible generic motivations for horizontal
merger. The first motivation, economy of scale and scope, is pro-competitive.
The other motivation, increased market power, is anti-competitive.
Mergers may have the effect of increasing the merged firm's market power,
enabling the firm to raise prices above the pre-merger level, in a manner
essentially identical to a cartel. Alternatively, mergers may have the effect
of lowering the merged firm's cost of production, enabling the firm to offer
a higher quality and quantity of product at a lower price, or, it is conceivable
that they may do both. When a merger could potentially produce a combi-
nation of the two effects, which is most often the case, the appropriate
policy prescription can not be determined through theoretical analysis. The
only way to answer the question would be empirically, that is to measure
and compare the social costs and benefits of the merger.42 Such a course
will, however, generally be a highly unreliable process.
37. Other reasons for tie-ins are to protect goodwill by preventing cheating on brand names
or to reallocate risk bearing. But see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1948), where the Court stated that: "The only situation... in which the protection of goodwill
may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so
detailed that they could not practicably be supplied."
38. This reflects the difficulty in extracting payment for information. See R. POSNEl & F.
EASTaERROOIC, supra note 30, at 213-14.
39. See Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive v. Collusive Theories, 72 AM. EcoN.
Rav. 289, 296-98 (1982).
40. Id. at 304.
41. Id.
42. R. CLAUE, INDUSTRiAL EcoNomics 264 (1985).
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To illustrate the possible effects of a merger we will utilize some simple
economic models. In perfect competition, the market is characterized by a
large number of firms each producing an identical product 43 None of the
firms is large relative to the market as a whole. Hence, each firm in a
perfectly competitive market faces a horizontal demand curve. 4 Each indi-
vidual firm will sell its output at the market price, over which it has no
control, and produce output at the point where price equals marginal cost. 5
The competitive price is set by the interaction of the industry supply curve
which is the summation of the individual firm's supply curves and the
industry's demand curve." Market equilibrium47 occurs at the point where
the supply curve intersects the demand curve (see figure 1, point E).
INDUSTRY
DEMAND
FiGuRE 1
For example, farmers producing wheat sell such similar goods that any
43. J. Hmam.rFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 288-320 (2d ed. 1980).
44. W. NtcHoLsoN, INTERMEDIATE MICROEcoNOMIcs 321-22 (3d ed. 1983).
45. Id.
46. J. HmsmWER, supra note 43, at 190-227.
47. Id. at 234.35. Market equilibrium exists when there is perfect competition, i.e., perfect
communication between buyer and seller, instantaneous equilibrium in the market and costless
transactions. Id.
1989]
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slight difference in price asked by sellers will induce buyers to switch to the
seller whose price is lowest. Any seller that raises his price above the market
price, even slightly, will lose all his sales. However, it follows that the seller
will not accept a lower than market price because he can sell all he cares to
produce at the market price.
In a perfectly competitive market, the firm's marginal revenue is the same
as its average revenue and is depicted by the demand curve for the firm's
output.4 1 Marginal revenue is the change in total revenue due to an increase
in sales of one unit.4 9 The firm will produce where its marginal cost curve
intersects its demand curve (figure 2, point E), and it will produce at output
level Q .
FIRM'S
MARGINAL COST
FIRM'S DEMAND
CURVE -
AVERAGE REVENUE -
MARGINAL REVENUE
QC
FiGwu 2
In contrast, a monopoly market involves only a single supplier.5 0 This
single firm faces the entire market demand. It has relative freedom in its
pricing policies in the sense that the monopolist faces a downward sloping
demand curve. The more downward sloping the demand curve (or more
48. Id. at 44-55, 269-70. The demand curve shows price as a function of quantity.
49. Expressed geometrically, the marginal revenue is the slope of the total revenue curve.
Id. at 44-51, 269-70.
50. Id. at 332.
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precisely, the more inelastic the demand curve around the intersection of the
demand curve and the marginal cost curve) the more monopoly, or market
power, the firm has. When the monopolist raises its price to Pm (see figure
3) his output will not drop to zero; instead it will decrease from Q. to Qm.
MARGINAL COST
FiGuRE 3
The monopolist will suffer a decrease in profits from his increasing price
(due to the loss of some customers, this is represented by area BCD) and
will weigh this against his increase in profits (due to the higher price charged
to his remaining customers, represented by area APmPcD). His net gain from
charging a monopoly price rather than the price that would have prevailed,
ceteris paribus, had the industry been characterized by perfect competition,
equals the difference between areas APmPeD and BCD.
The price the monopolist will charge and the quantity it will produce will
be determined by the point on the demand curve above the point at which
marginal revenue intersects marginal cost.5 In terms of efficiency, the mere
existence of profits for monopolies is not enough to justify their elimination
or regulation. Gains to entrepreneurs frequently entail pecuniary losses to
others.
51. Id. at 361.
19891
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As illustrated in figure 3, however, there is a deadweight loss to society
associated with monopoly pricing (area ABC). If the industry were compet-
itive the price would be PC. When prices rise to P,, consumers lose the area
ACPPm which would have been consumer surplus. The area ADPCP, goes
to the producer, so the net loss to society of consumer surplus is ADC. In
addition, as stated above, producers in a competitive market would have
earned BCD as producer surplus, but when the price rose to P,. this area
was lost. Thus the total inefficiency loss due to the monopoly is ADC plus
BCD which equals the area ABC.
Now let us assume that a merger has taken place in a competitive market.
There are several possible effects of such a merger. First, the merger could,
by increasing the firm's market power, enable the merged firms to behave
as a monopolist. The merged entity would be free to raise prices by restricting
quantity to the point at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
Monopoly profits can also be created by the formation of a cartel or by
collusion among an industry's members. Each firm in the cartel agrees to
produce less than it would under the dictates of perfect competition. The
overall effect of the collusion is to drive up prices so that all in the group
will benefit (a cartel can only drive up the price by cutting back production).
The negative effects of such a merger are the same as in the monopoly
model.
Second, the merger could give rise to cost savings from economics of scale
or scope or both. For example, assume that in our perfect competition model
above, the industry consisted of 150,000 independent wheat farmers of
approximately equal size. What would be a plausible explanation if 75,000
were bought out by or merged with a neighboring wheat farmer? Such a
merger clearly could not create monopoly power. Seventy five thousand
farms is still far more than necessary to ensure a competitive market, so the
reason for the mergers must lie elsewhere. The obvious explanation is that
they merged in order to take advantage of lower costs of production that
could arise out of economics of scale.
Initially the market is in equilibrium at P, Q, (see figure 4). After the
mergers, with new lower cost producing farms, the market equilibrium is re-
established at P,, Q1. The new firms are producing a larger quantity of
wheat at a lower price. This type of merger has the effect of increasing
social wealth.
Third, the merger could give rise to both cost savings and monopoly
power. The merged firms could act as a monopolist and set output where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. However, as cat be seen in figure
5, the post-merger prices may remain the same or move below the pre-
merger level. If this were the case, the consumers are made no worse off,
and the producers would gain a great deal. Such a merger would be social
wealth increasing.
Finally, the merger could give rise to economies of scale represented by
the lowering of the average cost curve, which would in and of itself result
in an increase in quantity and a decrease in price. However, because the
[Vol. 38:411
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merger also gives the firm some monopoly power, the post-merger price is
higher than the pre-merger level (figure 6). The effect of the merger on
social wealth is ambiguous. If there is only a small decrease in output, the
deadweight loss represented by triangle ABC may be smaller than the benefits
gained from economies of scale shown by the rectangle BDEF. The net
effect of the merger depicted in the diagram appears to be social wealth
increasing.
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Thus, the issue with regard to any specific proposed merger is whether
horizontal integration will: (1) permit the firm to lower quantity and increase
price; or, (2) permit the firm to reduce costs through economies of scale or
scope, or do both. And if the merger does both, determining which of the
two effects will be greater is an easy question to ask and an all but impossible
one to answer. Considering the difficulty courts have had in determining the
costs and benefits of cartels, tie-ins, rpm and basing-point pricing-all areas
in which there is strong agreement among economists-it is hardly surprising
that courts have been at sea in their attempts to analyze horizontal mergers.
III. TiE LAW OF HoRIzoNTAL MERGERS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade of
[Vol. 38:411
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commerce among the several States, or with a foreign nation, is hereby
declared to be illegal. ' '52
The Sherman Act is the foundation of antitrust law. The literal statute
does not employ the lexicon of economic theory. Economic theory is nec-
essary, however, to give meaning to an otherwise incomprehensible law. The
law cannot be given its literal meaning because, as the courts have long
recognized, every contract restricts trade, but it is inconceivable that the
intent of the Sherman Act is to outlaw all contractual agreements."
The first problem that arises in adjudicating antitrust cases is determining
the goals of antitrust law. The broadness of the statutory language creates
difficulties for the courts in developing legal policies toward industry and
firm practice. Robert Bork and other scholars argue that the goal of antitrust
law is to promote consumer welfare or economic efficiency.54 Bork argues
that consumer welfare is a "common denominator" by which gains in
destruction of monopoly power can be weighed against losses in productive
efficiency and that economic theory can provide the means of assessing the
direction as well as the relative size of the potential gains and losses."
Bork and those who would use economic efficiency as their touchstone
for judging putatively anti-competitive practices are not without intellectual
opponents. The other side of the academic debate includes those, such as
Dean Pitofsky, who argue that, in addition to the objective of economic
efficiency, Congress designed the antitrust laws to advance political and
other non-economic objectives.16 Despite the arguable merit of this assertion,
Bork argues, and we agree, that neither case law, legislative history, nor
scholarly work provides an adequate guide for operationalizing such non-
economic objectives. The substance of this policy conflict is that if courts
were required to trade off political goals against economic goals in their
decisions, they would be compelled to prohibit firms from offering lower
prices to consumers.
In many of the most recent antitrust cases, the United States Supreme
Court has employed language that indicates an adoption, albeit imperfect,
of the economic or social wealth maximizing, approach to antitrust law. In
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)
(rejecting notion that all contracts that restrain trade or commerce are illegal). See supra note
32.
54. R. BoRKc, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 79 (1979). Bork
employs the term consumer welfare but appears to intend the economist's concept of social
wealth. See also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 7.31 (1978); R. POSNER, supra
note 29, at 8-22.
55. R. BORK, supra note 54, at 79.
56. Dean Pitofsky argues that Congress was not concerned only with allocative efficiency
or economic considerations in 1890, 1914 or 1950 when the antitrust laws were passed. Pitofsky,
Luncheon Panel Discussion: Has Economics Rationalized Antitrust?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 607,
613 (1983). See also Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 1140 (1981).
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Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,57 for example, the Court unanimously reached the
conclusion that consumers who pay higher prices for goods as a result of
antitrust violations are injured in their property within the meaning of section
4 of the Clayton Act. In so ruling, the Court said, "Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription."18
Further, both the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division have unequivocally
adopted the economic approach. In 1980, the FTC decided to drop its 1978
complaint against DuPont in which that company was charged with attempt-
ing to monopolize the titanium dioxide industry. The FTC reasoned that
"the essence of the competitive process is to induce firms to become more
efficient and to pass the benefits of the efficiency along to the consumer." 9
For the purposes of this Article we will assume that the goal of the
antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. In so doing, we do little
more than narrow the question to one that can be meaningfully discussed,
not necessarily one that can be satisfactorily answered. We are still left with
the monumental problem of determining whether or not a particular merger
will promote economic efficiency.
A. Merger Case Law
The law governing horizontal mergers is in a state of flux. Leading, but
fairly outmoded, Supreme Court decisions have turned on the increase in
concentration within an industry, even if trivial. Accordingly, the Court has
been extremely hostile to all mergers. 60 Under this theory, the primary focus
for predicting whether a merger will be anti-competitive has been the market
share held by the merging firms. 61 The first step in this process is to define
the market in which the merged firm competes. 62 Once the relevant market
57. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
58. Id. at 334-43. On the other hand in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150 (1983), the Court recognized congressional intent to protect
small business from price discrimination in favor of larger firms.
59. Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1980.
60. See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Supreme Court
noted that Congress intended for the amended § 7 of the Clayton Act to be used to prevent
concentration of economic power through merger. Here, the Court found that a 5% market
share in several cities violated antitrust laws. Since this decision few litigated horizontal mergers
have been held valid. See also Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
61. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 322 n.8 ("[s]tatistics reflecting the shares of the market
controlled by the industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary
index of market power. .. ").
62. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D.D.C. 1986).
The court found it necessary to define the market where the merger participants competed at
the outset of the merger analysis, saying:
[p]roper market analysis directs attention to the nature of the products that the
acquirer and the acquired company principally sell, the channels of distribution
they primarily use, the outlets they employ to distribute their products to the
ultimate consumer, and the geographic areas they mutually serve. Factors affecting
price and interchangeability of products must be considered.
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has been defined, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that
the proposed merger will increase the merged entity's market share percentage
beyond acceptable limits.63 Unless there is evidence to rebut the prima facie
showing, the merger will almost always be held illegal.64
For example, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,6s the Supreme
Court held that where a horizontal merger leads to a "significant increase
in the concentration of firms" within a market and provides the merged
entity with "an undue percentage share," it is "presume[d] illegal."" This
rule was further expanded in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,67
where the Court held that "even slight increases in concentration" are
presumptively illegal if concentration in that market is already great."8
The Court reaffirmed the presumption of illegality in United States v.
Pabst Brewing,69 where the government alleged that the acquisition of the
nation's eighteenth largest brewer by the tenth largest brewer violated section
7 of the Clayton Act because it accelerated concentration already occurring
in the beer industry. 70 The complaint charged that "the effect of this ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly in the production and sale of beer in the United States and in
various sections thereof .. .""
Not until United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,12 did the Court
sanction a particular method for rebutting a prima facie showing of anti-
competitive effect." Under this approach, a more in-depth evaluation of a
63. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (increased percentages
in market share raise inference that the effect of a contemplated merger may be to substantially
lessen competition).
64. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (evidence which
examined structure, history and probable future of the coal industry outweighed a prima facie
case based on an increase in market share).
65. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
66. Id. at 362-67.
67. 377 U.S. 271 (1963).
68. Id. at 278-81. The Court found that a merger which would increase the market share
of the merged entity by only 1.3% still had a probable anti-competitive effect on the particular
industry involved.
69. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
70. Id. at 547-51.
71. Id. at 547.48. The Supreme Court held that the merger, which produced an entity with
only a 4A9% share of the U.S. market, was illegal because the merged entity held an undue
percentage share o? the relevant market. Id. at 550-52. The trend in the beer industry was
toward fewer competitors and greater concentration among larger firms. Therefore, the Court
felt that the merger between Pabst and Blatz, even though they were relatively small, would be
an acceleration of that concentration.
72. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
73. Id. at 494-504. The Court said that notwithstanding the statistical showing, which was
sufficient to call forth the presumption of illegality established by Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, "a
further examination of the particular market, its structure, its history, and probable future is
appropriate." Id. at 498 (quoting Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322
(1962)).
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particular market is encouraged. Thus, any statistical case may be overcome
by evidence that the market share and concentration statistics misstate the
true competitive conditions within an industry.74
In contrast to the weight of Supreme Court precedent, current government
enforcement guidelines and more recent lower court decisions manifest a
more tolerant view of concentration levels. Since General Dynamics, the
lower courts have been willing to consider evidence other than market
structure statistics in evaluating the effects horizontal mergers may have on
competition. 7 Recently, the Second Circuit indicated that barriers to entry
and ease of entry are important factors to consider in merger analysis. In
United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,76 the DOJ sought to enjoin a
merger that gave the merging firms a 48.8 percent share of the containerized
waste-hauling market. In approving the merger, the court ruled that the
higher market share currently held by the defendant did not reflect its future
market power and that the defendant would be unable to increase its price
above a competitive level.7
Other federal circuit courts of appeal have reacted favorably to evidence
that a merger would produce a 4tronger, more efficient competitor. In United
States v. International Harvester Co.,7a for example, the government chal-
lenged Harvester's acquisition of a stock interest in Steiger Tractor, Inc. The
court held that any inference of anti-competitive effect created by the market
share figures was rebutted by evidence that Steiger was unable to obtain
sufficient capital to remain an effective competitor except through the ar-
rangement with Harvester. 79
74. Id. at 498. The merger was construed as having no substantial probability of anticom-
petitive effect.
75. C. H-us, ANTTRUST ADViSOR 186 (3d ed. 1985). These additional factors include ease
of entry, weakness of the company being acquired, pro-competitive consequences of the merger,
and the failing company defense. Id. at 186-90.
See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States. 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (otherwise objectionable
merger justified where acquired company was near failing, and where acquired company had
been unsuccessful in locating other merger partners); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962) (courts should take into account the whether the industry "had
experienced asy.access"); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-84 (2d
Cir. 1984) (ease of entry into market constrains price increases (citing 1984 DOJ Merger
Guidelines, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169 Spec. Supp. § 3.3 at S-6)); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (where acquiror was a weak
competitor, and the market was a competitive one, preliminary injunction of merger denied);
United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding judgement
for acquiror-defendants based on finding that merger would have pro-competitive effect).
76. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 983-84. The court found future market power insubstantial due to the ease of
entry into the relevant product and geographic market. It further found that any anti-competitive
impact of the merger would be eliminated more quickly by competition than by litigation. Id.
78. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 777-80. Harvester produced 28% and Steiger 5% of high-powered farm tractors.
The four largest sellers at the time accounted for 83% of total sales. The court found that
competition in the high-powered tractor industry had intensified since Harvester's acquisition
of Steiger and that the new entity had become a stronger competitor in that industry. Id.
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B. Enforcement Agency Guidelines
The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines are designed to inform
businesses and the bar as to when the DOJ is likely to challenge mergers.A0
The unifying theme of the Guidelines is to prevent mergers that would
enhance or create market power.8' The DOJ's first step in analyzing any
action brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act is to determine the
relevant product market with respect to each product of the merging firms.
8 2
Under the 1984 guidelines, if consumers could switch or substitute alternative
products in response to a" small but significant and non-transitory" increase
in price, the DOJ will add to the product market definition those products
to which consumers could switch.83 The DOJ's second step in analyzing an
action brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act is to determine the
relevant geographic market. This is accomplished by ascertaining whether
consumers can respond to a "small but significant and non-transitory"
increase in price in one area by shifting to firms located outside the area.84
If the consumer can, then those areas should be included in the relevant
geographic market.8
The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for investigating and pros-
ecuting "unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce."8 s 6 The FTC has concurrent authority
with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and private plaintiffs to
enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 7
In June, 1982, the FTC issued a "Statement Concerning Horizontal Mer-
gers." 8  The FTC Statement emphasizes general principles, thus making it
difficult to apply to concrete fact situations. However, in the opening
comment it states that the FTC will give "considerable weight" to the DOJ
Guidelines.
The FTC follows an approach much like that of the DOJ in defining
product and geographic markets to analyze mergers. The FTC merger state-
80. DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, at § I. Section 1 states that "[t]he Guidelines
are designed primarily to indicate when the Department is likely to challenge mergers, not how
it will conduct the litigation of cases that it decides to bring." Id. The Guidelines include
relevant standards used by the DOJ in evaluating mergers and definitions of pertinent terms.
81. Id. Section 1 also points out that the DOJ seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with
the majority of mergers which are either competitively beneficial or neutral.
82. Id. at § 2.11. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C § 18, relates to the acquisition
of the stock of one company by another company. See supra note 11.
83. DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, at § 2.11.
84. Id. at § 2.31.
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). The FTC also has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ and
private plaintiffs to enforce sections 2, 3 & 8 of the Clayton Act, codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,
14, 19 (1982). 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
88. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers (1982) [here-
inafter FTC Merger Statement].
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ment indicates that: (1) "Where cross-elasticity of demand for separate
products or services is high, they normally will be in the same product
market. Similarly, a high cross-elasticity of supply tends to suggest the
existence of a common product market"; 9 and, (2) "As a general proposi-
tion, an area is a separate geographic market if a change in the price of the
product in that area does not, within a relevant period to time, induce
substantial changes in the quantity of product sold in other areas."' 9
Once the product and geographic markets are defined, the DOJ and FTC
approach merger analysis in a manner similar to that enunciated in Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States,9' albeit with thresholds of anti-competitive-
ness far higher than that of the Supreme Court. In addition, the Guidelines
look to the reason why market concentration may be economically undesir-
able, instead of focusing exclusively on the statistics of concentration.
The Guidelines suggest that the DOJ will challenge all mergers that would
create or facilitate the exercise of market power.' 2 They look primarily to
concentration as a barometer of the potential for lowering quantity and
raising prices above the competitive level, and mention, only in passing,
increased efficiencies or other pro-competitive effects of mergers." In order
to determine whether market power has been created, the DOJ uses the HHI
to aid in its interpretation of market data. The index is defined as the sum
of squares of the sizes of firms in an industry where size is the percentage
of total assets or sales etc.94 The HHI for a given market is calculated by
squaring the percentage market share of each firm in the market and adding
the resulting figures. 95
In evaluating horizontal mergers, the DOJ will consider both post-merger
market concentration and the increase in concentration resulting from the
89. Id. § VI(A) (1982).
Cross-elasticity of demand is defined as equal to the percentage change in the amount of
good x demanded, divided by the percentage change in the price of good y. K. CLtAxsoN &
R. MILLER, supra note 1, at 55.
Cross-elasticity of supply is defined as equal to the percentage change in the amount of good
x supplied by the producer of good x, divided by the percentage change in the price of good
y. Id. at 57.
Whenever cross-elasticity is positive, the two commodities are classified as substitutes and,
therefore, should be included in the same product market definition.
90. FTC Merger Statement, supra note 88, at § VI(B).
91. 370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1962). The Court stated that the increase in market concentration
produced by mergers would be one of the most important factors to be considered in appraising
the anti-competitive effect of a horizontal merger.
92. Section 1 of the DOJ Merger Guidelines states: "The unifying theme of the Guidelines
is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise." DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, at § 1.
93. Section 3.5 of the DOJ Merger Guidelines discusses in two paragraphs the possibility
of evidence of efficiency being used to defend a merger. Such evidence must be "clear and
convincing." DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, at § 3.5.
94. R. CLAR E, supra note 42, at 14-15.
95. Id.
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merger. Where the post-merger HHI is below 1000 the DOJ will not challenge
the merger unless there are extraordinary circumstances. 96 Where the post-
merger HHI is above 1000 but below 1800 the DOJ is "unlikely" to challenge
the merger if the change in HHI resulting from the merger is less than 100. 97
If the change in HHI is more than 100, the DOJ is "likely" to challenge
the merger unless persuaded otherwise by other non-statistical market fac-
tors. 98 Where the post-merger HHI is above 1800 the DOJ is "unlikely" to
challenge the merger if the change in HHI is below 50.99 If the change in
HHI is between 50 and 100, the DOJ is "likely" to challenge the merger
unless persuaded otherwise by other non-statistical market factors.1'° If the
change in HHI is greater than 100, the DOJ is "likely" to challenge and is
unlikely to be persuaded otherwise except in extraordinary cases.' 10
There are a number of problems with this approach. First, data on market
share is very difficult to obtain and inherently unreliable. Second, and most
important, as we will argue more fully in Section V, the DOJ cutoff points
for determining when it will challenge a merger appear to be arbitrary.
Further, the Guidelines largely ignore any pro-competitive effects of a merger.
Thus, the Guidelines may go too far in markets where the merger increases
the HHI by more than 100 without regard to additional factors. 102
C. Conflicting Schools of Thought
The Guidelines do not reflect an economic consensus. According to the
Guidelines, the primary predictor of the likelihood of collusion in a market
is the size distribution of the sellers' market share. The HHI is used to
summarize size distribution. The higher the HHI, the more likely that the
DOJ will challenge the merger. This assumes, however, that finns in con-
centrated industries are more likely to engage in either tacit or explicit
collusion.
Supporters of the traditional school of thought argue that the structure
of an industry determines the conduct of the firm, which in turn determines
the performance of that industry. 0 3 In a concentrated industry, firms are
96. DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, at § 3.11(a).
97. Id. § 3.11(b).
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 3.11(c).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Problems confront virtually all summary concentration indexes, including the HHI.
The following is a partial list of the inadequacies of most concentration ratios: "1) Because
they are based on national figures, they ignore regional market power and concentration; 2)
They ignore imports and exports; 3) They do not consider the ability of potential entrants to
compete." K. CLARKuSON & R. MILLER, supra note 1, at 79. A particular operational shortcoming
of the HHI is that the result is very sensitive to measurement error of the share of the largest
seller in the market.
103. J. BI.N, BAuRIEs To NEW COMPETITION 2-4 (1956); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMiC PERFoR ANCE 4 (1980); Price and Production Policies of Larger
Scale Enterprise, AM. EcoN. REv. Surp. 29 (Mar. 1939) (round table discussion).
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protected from the threat of competition by barriers to entry. There are only
a few sellers in the industry and this has the effect of lowering the transaction
costs inherent in any collusive arrangement. In such an industry, through
either tacit or explicit collusion, it is argued the firms can and will agree to
lower output and raise prices. Therefore, economists of the traditional school
seek strong enforcement of the antitrust merger laws in concentrated mar-
kets.1o
Economists of the "Chicago School," while not rejecting out of hand the
concentration-collusion doctrine of the traditional school, stress the impor-
tance of the competitive process rather than the structure of the markets. 05
They argue that firms that grow large through merger can only maintain
their increased market share by offering better products, prices, or both.
Moreover, mergers are a natural and usually beneficial aspect of the com-
petitive process. Firms do not generally acquire one another unless they
expect that the combination will be more efficient than the separate entities.
Therefore, "Chicago School" economists are more inclined to believe that
most mergers are pro-competitive and are intended to enhance profitability
through superior efficiency.'0
IV. DETERMINING WHETHER A GwvEN MERGER is ANTI-COMPETITIVE
A. Science and Rhetoric
How can we decide between these competing hypotheses in a particular
case to determine whether a merger is pro- or anti- competitive?
A merger may produce above normal profits by facilitating the efforts of
the firms in the industry to cooperate on a policy to restrict output and raise
prices (cartelization). The anti-competitive effect of such market activity is
obvious and easy to describe analytically and even to measure, although
imperfectly. This is, in fact, the intended purpose of the HHI. The HHI
serves as a proxy for the notion that the more concentrated an industry, the
greater the possibility for the firms within it to behave like a perfect cartel. 07
On the other hand, a merger may have been motivated by anticipated
economies of scale and scope. It is extremely difficult, however, to describe
analytically and impossible to measure systematically these potential pro-
competitive effects of a merger. Economists can, in the typical case, do little
104. F. SCHMR, supra note 103, at 490.
105. R. BoRu, supra note 54, at 408-25. Bork blames the inadequate performance of the
legal institutions that shape antitrust law on the "absence of a rudimentary understanding of
market economics." Id. at 425; See also Demsetz, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation,
19 J. LAW & ECON. 371 (1976); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis. 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 925 (1979).
106. R. PosNER, supra note 29, at 111-13.
107. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of cartels and their
associated evils.
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more than describe this potential result through the graphic illustration of a
downward shift of indeterminate magnitude in the firm's average cost curve.
How much it will shift, or indeed, rigorous proof that it will shift, is
generally beyond the capacity of the art and science of economics either as
an analytical or an empirical discipline. The inability of economics to sys-
tematically deal with economies of scale and scope with even the limited
rigor of something analogous to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index can be
illustrated most clearly by examining increases in plant or firm size that
seem to be exceptions.
Consider the growth of oil tankers. There is a well-known engineering
principle known as the 2/3 power rule relating changes in the volume of a
container to changes in surface area. If one doubles each linear dimension
of a container, the volume of the container will increase eight-fold, and the
surface area of the container will increase four-fold. Since in operating oil
tankers, or other cargo ships for that matter, output will be proportional to
volume and at least some elements of cost will be proportional to surface
area, the economies of scale of building bigger oil tankers is not only
analytically obvious but, in addition, can be described with mathematical
precision. These economies of scale, in part, explain why oil tankers grew
markedly in size in the 1960's and 1970's.
The very power of the 2/3 power rule as an explanation and technical
demonstration of economies of scale, is itself the undoing of such explana-
tions. God has not repealed the 2/3 power rule. Thus, one is left with the
question of why oil tankers have not continued to grow. Why isn't there a
tanker the size of Manhattan Island plying the waters of the Persian gulf?
The obvious answer is that along with economies of scale there are disecon-
omies of scale. Over certain ranges of output those diseconomies swamp the
economies. In the case of oil tankers, the difficulties of building, servicing,
loading and unloading an oil tanker the size of Manhattan would generate
costs that dwarf any cost savings in steel or labor in building or operating
such a tanker.
But where is the mathematical concomitant to the 2/3 power rule that
explains why it is sensible to stop increasing the size of oil tankers? There
is none. Instead we are left with plausible lists and descriptions of costs that
must suffice as an explanation. There is simply no limit to the number and
variety of possible economies and diseconomies of scale and scope, nor any
general method for quantifying them, and a fortiori no possibility of sum-
ming them up in a way that would demonstrate the direction and size of a
shift in a firm's average cost curve in the event of a merger. Ex post it may
be possible to measure shifts in cost curves, albeit with questionable accuracy,
but ex ante it is not possible to analytically, mathematically, or empirically
demonstrate that such shifts will occur with a degree of certainty that should
pass muster in any referred journal or court of law. Thus, as a judicial
matter, we are generally left with but one blade of the scissors, some measure
of increased concentration, such as the HHI. This measure will undoubtedly
rise as a consequence of the merger, and serve as a sign of the bare possibility
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of collusive restraint of trade. On the other side, there exists no comparable
analytical tool to capture the possible economies of scale and scope and
provide a complete tool with which to cut to the heart of the question of
whether a merger will be pro- or anti-competitive.
Nor is the one blade of the scissors we retain very sharp. It is beyond
dispute that the greater the concentration, the greater the possibility and
effectiveness of attempts to cartelize the industry. It is obvious that an
industry with but one firm is a monopoly and can behave as such, and that
an industry with 500 equal sized firms is effectively perfectly competitive. It
is also clear that as one moves from an industry structured like the latter to
one more like the former, the possibility of cartelization increases. But at
what rate? We are in essentially the same position in answering that question
as the geographer who, noting that the Dead Sea is the lowest point on the
surface of the Earth and the top of Mt. Everest the highest, then wishes to
determine the altitude of points on a line between those two locations. If he
walks from the former to the latter convinced that the altitude will steadily
increase, he will discover that both he and his theory are all wet when he
reaches the Persian Gulf. So too for us. While at some point as an industry
becomes more concentrated it may, through collusion leading to cartelization,
function more like a monopoly, the point at which it becomes, for antitrust
purposes, sufficiently close to a monopoly is unknown and probably un-
knowable. The plethora of "theories" of oligopoly is itself evidence that
relying on measures of concentration as a proxy for the likelihood of
cartelization is highly suspect. Such measures of concentration and the
thresholds employed by the DOJ and FTC are little more than semi-educated
guesses, lacking both reliability and universality.
B. Evidence of Post-Merger Performance
Three recent studies have addressed the issue of whether mergers generally
are social wealth decreasing or social wealth increasing. 08 Rather than at-
tempting to econometrically derive the cost and demand curves of the firms
involved, these studies compared the changes in stock value of merged firms
within an industry with the changes in stock value of the unmerged firms in
that same industry. If the merger creates monopoly power or increases the
risk of collusion, all firms in the industry, regardless of their participation
in the merger, will be able to increase their prices. Interestingly, those firms
that do not participate in the merger will gain relatively more because, unlike
108. Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholders' Wealth, 11 J. Fn . EcoN.
241 (1983) (finding little evidence to indicate mergers would result in collusive, anti-competitive
effects); Stilman, Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers, II1 J. FIN. EcoN.
225 (1983) (used stock prices from rival firms to predict merger's effect on competition); Wier,
The Costs of Antimerger Lawsuits: Evidence From the Stock Market, II J. FIN. EcoN. 207
(1983) (finding that relief imposed by antitrust law is costly to a firm's stockholders and
therefore wealth decreasing).
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the merged firms, they will not have to decrease output in order to increase
price, but can both increase output and price. All shareholders in the industry
will gain, but shareholders in firms that do not participate in the merger
will gain relatively more. If the merger instead improves the quality of the
product or results in lower costs and lower prices, then the stock price of
the merged firm will increase relative to that of the unmerged firms in that
industry. These studies find that, in the large majority of mergers, it is the
latter scenario that has occurred. The fact that investors in unmerged firms
usually lose indicates that most mergers are pro-competitive. The results are
inconsistent with the traditional school's concentration-collusion doctrine
and the market power hypothesis in that they indicate that the change in
the structure of the industry, i.e. more concentration, does not lead to higher
prices and decreased output.Y9
Nonetheless, as useful as such studies may be, they are of little help to a
court or enforcement agency that must answer the question of whether a
proposed merger will be social wealth increasing rather than whether an
actual past merger was social wealth increasing. They do clearly demonstrate,
however, that the effects of pro-competitive and anti-competitive mergers
are very different on competing firms in the industry. Thus, the answer to
the prospective effects question may lie in the conduct of competing firms.
C. RC's Position: The Evidentiary Weight of Self-Interest
Both economists and businessmen are anxious to know the effects of
merger. The economist's interest is generally in discovering whether the
merger is efficient and being able to demonstrate this to his colleagues using
the tools of his profession. He seeks to determine whether, and by how
much, social wealth will be increased or decreased by a merger. The busi-
nessman's interest, on the other hand, is motivated by private gain. He
wishes only to learn whether the merger will add to his own net wealth. His
standard of proof and the evidence he would regard as persuasive are a
function of the world of business, not the world of the academic economist.
Nonetheless, a businessman's reaction to a merger within his industry tells
lawyers and economists something about the merger's effect on competition.
The recent merger activity in the carbonated soft drink industry is a powerful
illustration of this proposition.
Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Dr. Pepper, and 7-Up did not simply have an academic
interest in the outcome of the mergers. They were all greatly concerned with
whether or not their mergers would be profitable. If the merger had been
profitable, they would have been largely indifferent to the reason why.
Whether or not this increased profitability resulted from the exercise of
monopoly power or decreased costs, they would have approved of the merger.
Similarly, they would have disapproved the merger if it reduced their profits,
109. R. PosaER & F. EASrmuROOK, supra note 30, at 42.
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regardless of the cause. Other firms in the industry, however, such as RC,
would have been differentially affected depending on the source of the gain
to the merged firms.
RC is a competitor in the carbonated soft drink industry. It was not a
party to the proposed Coca-Cola and Pepsi mergers. In this position, RC
stands to benefit from, and has no incentive to challenge, acquisitions that
may lead to anti-competitive pricing. If the motivation for a merger is anti-
competitive, the newly created entity would have sufficient market power to
increase its profits by lowering output and raising prices. Other firms in the
industry would be free to take advantage of this opportunity to sell their
output at a higher price or to capture a larger market share by selling their
output at its original price. Competing producers have even more to gain
from an anti-competitive merger in their industry than do the merged firms
themselves because the competitors need not reduce output in order to raise
prices.
On the other hand, RC has a substantial incentive to oppose those mergers
of rivals that are pro-competitive in the sense that they will make those
rivals more efficient and reduce the price the rivals can charge consumers.
If the motivation for the merger is pro-competitive, enabling the merged
entity to lower costs by utilizing economies of scale and scope, the merger
will result in lower prices and/or a better quality product. If other firms in
the industry, such as RC, wish to survive, they must follow suit and lower
their prices. If they have a high cost of production, they may be precluded
from lowering their prices and be forced from the market. Therefore, a
competing firm would oppose any pro-competitive merger within its industry.
Because RC sought to enjoin the Coca-Cola and Pepsi mergers, it is fair to
conclude that those mergers would have been pro-competitive and, therefore,
financially damaging to RC.110
The HHI for the carbonated soft drink industry immediately prior to these
planned mergers was 2372. The HHI as employed by the DOJ is divided
into three regions: unconcentrated, moderately concentrated and highly con-
centrated. 2372 is 572 points greater than the highest figure used by the DOJ
in its Merger Guidelines to classify a market as "highly concentrated." The
DOJ Merger Guidelines deem an acquisition in such a highly concentrated
market as likely to substantially lessen competition if the HHI increases by
more than 100 points. If the Coca-Cola ox' Pepsi acquisitions had been
consummated, the HHI would have increased by 548 points and 346 points
respectively. If both acquisitions proceeded, the HHI will have jumped by
894 points to 3266. That increase is almost nine times as much as the changes
the DOJ considers likely to substantially lessen competition. Yet, if we
110. RC is not unusual in having brought suit to prevent this merger. The vast majority of
antitrust cases are brought by private plaintiffs with private rather than public concerns.
Schmalensee, Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics, 72 AM. EcoN. REV. PROCEEDINGS
1, 24-27 (1982).
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assume that RC is accurately representing its own interests, these mergers
would have enhanced competition rather than lessened it. The singular
importance of the HHI in the Justice Department Guidelines, and the low
thresholds it employs, results in an unwarranted hostility to most mergers.
It appears, therefore, that the DOJ's HHI guidelines may be extremely and
dangerously conservative.
Those guidelines use the relatively sophisticated and statistically efficient
tool of the HHI, and employ specific arithmetic cut-off points. This use of
mathematics gives a veneer of precision. The numerical divisions employed
by the DOJ suggest greater precision, however, than is possible with available
economic tools and information."' It can, of course, be said in defense of
such a measure that it is better to carefully than to sloppily measure, even
when using an admittedly imprecise scale. Nonetheless, this example illus-
trates that care in measurement is not a substitute for sound theory and an
accurate scale.
The HHI and the DOJ Guidelines are attempts to objectify the notion
that the greater the concentration in an industry, the greater the market
power of the leading firms and the greater the payoff to, and possibility of
collusion among, those firms. There is no persuasive theoretical or empirical
evidence of the rate at which anti-competitive market power increases in
relation to the HHI. In addition, the Justice Department guidelines do not
even attempt to give systematic weight to the pro-competitive effects of
possible economies of scale and scope that might result from mergers. Despite
the enormous HHIs in the proposed soft drink mergers of 1986, the mergers
between Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper and between Pepsi and 7-Up would
likely have been pro-competitive." 2
Of course, one could argue that, in opposing mergers, many competitors
are really afraid of subsequent predatory pricing efforts on the part of the
merged entities rather than honest competition. Although RC did not allege
predatory pricing in its complaint,'" we will address the issue. Predation
refers to a firm's pricing behavior which is aimed at inhibiting the devel-
opment of rival businesses. Accordingly, the established firm prices its
product extremely low, forcing competitors to match the low price or leave
the market." 4
Predation has sometimes been called destructive, or cut throat, competition" 15
because it was thought that such pricing would destroy the competitive
111. R. POSNER & F. EAMRBROOK, supra note 30, at 64.
112. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HHI and its use
by the DOJ in evaluating mergers.
113. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 117-22 (1986), the Supreme
Court held that competing firms must specifically allege that the merging firm would engage
in predatory pricing.
114. Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213, 219-22 (1979).
115. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HAxv. L. REv. 697 (1975). See also Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes
and Comments, 15 J. LAW & EcoN. 129 (1972).
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process which produces market efficiency. The dominant firm would cut
prices to drive out competitors in the short run in order to raise prices
towards the monopoly level in the long run. However, the emerging academic
consensus appears to be that such pricing behavior imposes as much harm
on the so-called predator as on the victim." 6 In fact, the predator will lose
more revenue than its rival.
For example, if post-merger Coca-Cola behaves as a "predator" by low-
ering its price below its average variable cost" 7 and RC, along with other
rivals in the industry, reduce their price to the level set by Coca-Cola, then
all manufacturers in the industry will suffer losses relative to their respective
sales volumes. Therefore, because Coca-Cola's sales volume is larger than
its rivals, the losses sustained by Coca-Cola will be proportionately larger.
Furthermore, Coca-Cola will be unable to recoup the losses it incurred
during predation. It can increase price when rivals leave the market, but
new entrants attracted by the high prices will drive price down, thereby
precluding the predator from recouping its losses. A fear of predatory pricing,
therefore, is an implausible explanation of why RC so vehemently challenged
the proposed mergers.
Competitor opposition to mergers is an inherently reliable source of evi-
dence. All the conclusions that we have drawn are derivative. Rather than
attempting to carefully examine the carbonated soft drink industry and gather
detailed information about the industry and then econometrically estimating
the possible shifts in the curves that would result from these mergers, we
instead relied on the second-hand information of the behavior of the parties
involved. Had we engaged in econometric estimation, it is doubtful that
many economists would be as persuaded by those results as by the course
we actually chose.
Skepticism about the reliability of econometrics as a tool for definitively
revealing the shape of and shifts in cost or demand curves is well founded.
As Wasilly Leontief said in his 1970 American Economic Association Pres-
idential address, "in no other field of empirical inquiry has so massive and
sophisticated a statistical machinery been used with such indifferent re-
sults.""'  The state of the art has not been dramatically advanced since he
wrote. Thus, there is sound reason to place more trust in conclusions drawn
116. See Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAw & Eco. 259, 268
(1966) ("no sensible monopolist would cut prices before having ascertained whether he and the
existing entrant can agree on merger terms."). Accord Campbell, Predation and Competition
in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 CoLuis. L. Rav. 1625, 1626-30 (1987).
117. Pricing below the reasonably anticipated short run marginal cost, which is the rate of
change in total cost per unit change in output, is considered predatory. However, because
calculating marginal cost is difficult, Areeda and Turner suggest average variable cost, which
is the sum of all variable cost divided by output, should be used as an alternative. Pricing
below average variable cost, they argue, should be per se illegal. See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 115, at 716-18.
118. Leontief, Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts, 61 AM. Eco. Ray. 1, 3
(1971).
[Vol. 38:411
HORIZONTAL MERGERS
from the self-aggrandizing motives of market actors, rather than in an
independent application of the empirical and statistical tools of the economics
profession to the raw data.
Nonetheless, there is something peculiar in this process. How is it that
economics, a profession dedicated to understanding how markets function,
must stand mute or rely on derivative evidence from businessmen when asked
to determine the effect of a merger, while at the same time businessmen,
usually untrained in this arcane art, can be certain enough about the merger
to risk hundred of millions of dollars and their careers? We believe the
answer is one of rhetoric. The quantity, and more importantly the kind, of
evidence that will persuade a businessman has not been considered appro-
priate or legitimate in economic discourse. It is ironic that, although econ-
omists may be persuaded that the mergers in question were likely to be pro-
competitive by the fact that RC opposed them, economists do not generally
inquire into or make use of the evidence or reasoning that persuaded RC.
Why is this? It can, with some merit, be said that such evidence is largely
inaccessible. We do not believe, however, that it is inaccessibility alone that
explains why economists are loath to make such inquiries. The more complete
answer seems to be related to the notion that economics is a science. The
economist requires "proof," where proof means a certain category of evi-
dence that can be translated into either statistical confidence limits or an
analytical model. The businessman's reasoning process and data have not
been, and perhaps cannot be, manipulated so as to achieve that degree of
reification. Therefore, as an analytical tool, it is considered inadequate.
It seems indefensible to take the position that one can reason from
businessmen's actions to their motives, and from their motives to the effects
of the merger, and yet that one must not employ the reasoning process and
evidence that propelled the businessman from his motives to his actions. In
addition to any conclusions to be drawn about: (1) this particular merger;
(2) the Justice Department merger guidelines; and (3) the state of our
knowledge, or more accurately, lack of knowledge, of the competitive effects
of mergers, we wish to suggest that broadening the rhetoric of economics
as it applies to antitrust questions would be enlightening."19
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
To summarize, economic theory is not a powerful enough tool to reveal
with certainty whether Coca-Cola, Dr. Pepper, Pepsi, and 7-Up were correct
in their anticipation that merger would permit them to either lower costs,
raise revenues, or both. Even if the mergers had taken place, it is likely that
there would have been too much statistical noise to definitively determine
econometrically whether the mergers were in fact advantageous to the par-
119. See McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LnrRATURE 481 (1983).
McCloskey argues that economists have developed a misguided fixation on methodology that
stultifies and limits the way in which they write and think about economic questions.
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ticipating parties. Nevertheless, the self-aggrandizing concerns and relatively
greater knowledge of the participating parties of the particular market com-
bined with the magnitude of the financial risk entailed in the decision to
merge, creates a strong presumption that their plan was a correctly devised
attempt to increase private wealth.
In a similar manner, it is safe to assume that: (1) RC's motives were
selfish; (2) RC gave a good deal of thought to its actions with regard to the
merger given: (a) the cost of engaging in a lawsuit, and; (b) the fact that
opposing a merger whose purpose was to facilitate cartelizing the industry
would be the equivalent, for RC, of shooting itself in the foot, and; (3) RC
is relatively knowledgeable about the nature of the carbonated soft drink
industry and market. Therefore, with equal confidence, we can conclude
that RC, in its opposition to the mergers, likewise correctly anticipated that
these mergers were not intended to, and'would not, facilitate a cartelizing
of the carbonated soft drink industry. The mergers rather, would have, by
lowering production costs of the merged entities, lowered the prices of the
products that compete with RC. RC would, thereby, be forced to either
lower prices, lose market share, or both. It is likely, therefore, that these
mergers, had they occurred, would have been efficient. Comparative static
price theory makes unequivocally clear that a merger resulting in lower prices
increases social wealth.
The broader relevance of this important evidence showing pro-competi-
tiveness is that it suggests that the HHI, at least as used by the DOJ and
FTC, is a demonstrably unreliable criterion of anti-competitiveness. Although
the defendant has a theoretical option of rebutting the HHI's presumption,
there is currently no sufficiently general way to accomplish this feat. The
FTC and DOJ enforcement policies undoubtedly have a chilling effect on
many truly pro-competitive mergers. Each denial of a merger that would
have been pro-competitive not only injures the merging entities, it injures
the public as well. Such a result is simply unacceptable antitrust law from
a policy standpoint.
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